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 PUNISHMENT AND CRIME
 Ross Harrison and R. A. Duff
 I--Ross Harrison
 PUNISHMENT NO CRIME
 The big lie, the great false conjecture, is a potent creator of
 philosophy. Around us are unproblematic tables and chairs.
 Unproblematic, that is, until philosophy gets to work. Then we
 get memorable and massive simple claims such as that we might
 all be dreaming or that the tables are ideas in the mind of God.
 This is all highly unlikely. So also for punishment. It surrounds
 us like the tables and chairs. As social beings living in organised
 society under a government, our lives are controlled and
 bounded by punishment. Here again the philosophically
 memorable treatments are the large, simple, false conjectures.
 Perhaps, it is conjectured, the whole practice is completely
 unjustified. Moral judgements, it is supposed, rest on illusion, so
 that no social practice is justified. Or, although some practices
 are justified, punishment is not. Again, all highly unlikely. Most
 people engage in, or condone, the practice and think that it does
 make moral sense. Like the tables and chairs it was not
 problematic before the arrival of the philosophers.
 So the next attempt is to produce ajustification. More grand
 simple theories appear. Punishment, it is supposed, is right
 because of deterrence, or expression, or retribution, or the need
 to put people in touch with the good, or because it is actually the
 will of the criminal. Each of these when more fully examined
 again seems to be highly unlikely. A highly stipulative account
 of moral psychology is required before we discover that the
 normal punished criminal has actually willed his punishment.
 There are other ways of expressing things than with walls. A
 category mistake seems to be involved in the idea that the
 prisoner, in touch with the bars, is really in touch with the good.
 And the apparent absurdities of deterrence and retribution are a
 well-rehearsed route into a philosophical account of punishment.
 After the large lies and the great philosophers come the
 smaller followers. Each of us hedges our bets and blends our own
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 mixture from the various falsehoods. The standard method of
 producing an account of punishment is to show what is wrong
 with all the other theories. I shall not do this here, but restrict
 myself to examination of two accounts. One is utilitarianism.
 The other is the recent, striking (and anti-utilitarian) account of
 my co-symposiast, Antony Duff, in his book Trials and
 Punishments. With Duff, I think, we have another example of a
 memorable, striking error; an imaginative if false account from
 which a few bright threads might be woven into a more
 homespun if truer treatment. Or so it seems to me; Duff, of
 course, may have different views. We agree, however, that
 punishment requires justification. Punishment involves the inten-
 tional inflication of pain on others without their consent. Unless
 this can be specially justified, it must be wrong. If we cannot jus-
 tify it we will have discovered that it is a crime against humanity,
 a crime which we should seek to prevent, if not of course to punish.
 In utilitarianism, punishment is the device applied to men as
 they are to make them into men as they ought to be. Men are
 seekers of their own interest. What they ought to be is seekers of
 the general interest (the greatest happiness of the greatest
 number). So extra pains are artificially added to certain courses
 of action to make it not in their interest to engage in them. The
 theory is deterrent; people are deterred from such actions as
 rape or murder which are against the general interest by the
 belief that they are quite likely to hang (or whatever) if they do
 it. Viewed as another false simple theory, utilitarianism gets
 dismissed because the sums come out wrong. If the only motive is
 efficient calculation, posing the least threat that is needed to
 bring about the desired end, then it seems that we should end up
 with public disembowelling for parking on double yellow lines
 and a letter from the Secretary of State expressing disapproval for
 unpremeditated domestic murder. The psychology of the events
 is such that people are much more likely to be thinking of the
 implications of what they are doing when they are parking than
 when they are attacking their loved ones in a fit of anger. So the
 threatened disembowelling would deter practically everybody,
 achieving the desired effect at little cost, while, on the other
 hand, clogging up prisons with domestic murderers just causes
 everyone a lot of trouble with very little prospect of saving the
 life of any wife or husband.
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 This objection is not one which would worry any hard-bitten
 utilitarian. For what is right or wrong is what follows from
 utilitarian theory and if the theory tells us to threaten
 disembowelment when we had not expected it, that isjust one of
 the discoveries which one makes when one thinks about things.
 However, whatever we think of this objection, Duff has a more
 fundamental one which works against utilitarianism, however
 the sums come out. Utilitarianism recommends using one
 person for the good of someone else. On this theory of
 punishment, the criminal is sacrificed for the good of others; his
 punishment deters other potential criminals and so benefits
 those who would have suffered from the crimes. Yet this is to
 treat people as means and not as ends in themselves. Once we
 think that the essential nature of any justified trial and
 punishment is to treat people as rational and moral beings for
 their own sakes, then utilitarianism has to go. Duff does not end
 up with a simple theory, since his theory is a blend of retributive,
 expressive, and reformatory elements. But its central purpose is
 to find an account which respects the rationality and moral
 nature of the punished person. Punishment therefore is com-
 munication with a rational being for his own sake; to quote Duff
 'it aims to communicate to a criminal a proper understanding of
 the nature and implications of his offence, and to persuade him
 to accept his punishment as an appropriate penance for that
 offence' (p. 278).
 This is Duffs account, which I shall resist. However, matters
 are complicated by the fact that Duff recognises that this is an
 ideal account and could by no stretch of the imagination be
 regarded as an accurate description of our current penal
 practices. This is what punishment would have to be like to be
 justified; it does not justify the punishments currently handed
 out. At the end of his book, therefore, he considers the relation
 between the ideal and the actual. One would expect Duffat this
 point either to say that we actually should not have punishment,
 or that we should make actual punishments as like the ideal as
 possible. In fact he opts instead for a highly constrained form of
 utilitarianism which he had efficiently discredited earlier. I
 think, and shall now try to show, that on his own terms this is not
 the solution which he ought to adopt.
 The problem of how an ideal account applies in the actual
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 case is normally an example of the problem of ethical conflict.
 Ideally we would like everything; actually we cannot have it. So
 we have to choose which of the goods we should have, or which
 of the bads should be avoided. One solution is to have a way of
 balancing between the competing duties or moral imperatives.
 Utilitarianism is a solution of this sort. Arbitration is achieved
 by discovering how the competing duties contribute to some
 further value, or set of values. Another kind of solution is to think
 that no arbitration is possible. Conflict in duties is the inevitable,
 tragic, condition of man, arising directly from moral pluralism.
 In the ideal case these would cohere; in the actual case they do
 not, and we are provided no principle of selection, but just the
 certainty of moral error (for, whatever we do, some moral
 imperative will have been disobeyed). Duff denies that he has a
 solution, but he is not without resource. He says that he himself
 'would act unjustly to prevent the heavens falling' (p. 298). So,
 although Duff denies that there can be any talk of trading or
 comparing, it seems to me that this remark means that justice
 has for him a price. Justice can be traded off against heavens
 falling so that we can, in principle, say how many heavens
 should fall before it is right to be unjust. And this is, of course, to
 treat it in a consequentialist style.
 I may here be making too much of the very last page of Duffs
 book. But it is unclear how this part of his account differs from a
 sophisticated consequentialist one. For when he says that, in the
 ideal case, no type of consequentialist reasoning would be
 appropriate, his claim is that punishment which treated people
 as means would be evil. Yet it is also part of a utilitarian account
 that punishment is, in itself, an evil. Why it is evil of course
 differs. In one case it is simply because it is painful, in the other it
 is because it involves treating people as means. However, what
 you do with this evil when you have got it is very similar. Instead
 of treating it as a complete block to action, you decide whether
 this bit of evil is justified by some further good which it would
 provide. In both cases the ideal tells what is good or bad, and the
 actual poses the problem of finding the best mix of these things
 subject to empirical constraints.
 So I think that Duffs solution of the ideal and the actual is
 contrary to the spirit of the rest of his account. He should rather
 have said that in the actual case we should not punish at all. Of
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 course, greed might lead us to, but this would just be another
 example of sin. However, whatever is the truth about this, let me
 now turn to the more important question of whether Duff's
 central account is itself adequate. That is, even as an ideal,
 should our account of punishment be one in which it is held that
 punishment aims to communicate to a criminal an understanding
 of his offence, and to persuade him to accept that punishment as
 an appropriate penance, so that, as Duff puts it, 'the pain and
 suffering which begins as a coercive attempt to attract and direct
 the unrepentant criminal's attention should become the peni-
 tential pain which the repentant criminal accepts for himself (p.
 261).
 Many of the aspects which Duff concentrates on, such as
 communication, expression, or reformation, also fit perfectly
 happily into a utilitarian account. Any method which gets the
 desired results will serve in utilitarianism and it is a fairly well-
 attested fact that expression and communication are efficient.
 The openness of Bentham's panopticon, for example, was not
 just an efficient means of guarding the prisoners but also an
 efficient way of letting the general public see what was
 happening; and Bentham also devoted attention to how the
 device above its door could express the horror within. Com-
 munication is a central element in a mature deterrent theory
 and this communication is an appeal to rationality. People are
 understood to be rational men, in the economist's sense; that is,
 self-interested maximisers. They are told about the horrible
 consequences of certain courses of action and so given, as the
 saying is, an argument that they cannot refuse. Rational,
 prudential people are addressed by laws. This was part of
 Bentham's argument in favour of statute law and against
 common law. Common law, he says, treats people like dogs,
 punishing people retrospectively for actions already performed;
 but statute law warns them in advance, enabling them to frame
 their actions so as to avoid trouble.
 In utilitarianism, punishment is a message. The message, that
 'this does not pay' is a different message from Duff's 'we find this
 morally reprehensible', but it is none the less a message. Reform
 of the criminal is also part of a utilitarian account, since the
 punishment is supposed to influence his future actions. Yet
 Duff's point no doubt would be that these are just extras; that in
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 utilitarianism the central justification lies elsewhere. Punishment
 must be something which essentially performs these tasks and no
 others; not just something which manages to perform these tasks
 as a by-product of more central ones. Nor do all aspects of Duff s
 account have a utilitarian analogy. Utilitarianism does not have
 much use for penance, even as a by-product; the 'monkish
 virtues' and asceticism are generally not highly regarded. So
 Duffs account cannot just be mapped into a utilitarian one and
 I shall therefore now try to evaluate the rival accounts.
 Suppose we start with the idea of natural punishments--cases
 where people suffer because of the natural probable consequences
 of their acts. People engage in conduct which they know to be
 imprudent and are, as we say, punished for it. There is an
 implicit valuation here; we say that they are punished because
 we think that they have been imprudent or otherwise acted
 irrationally. Courage is a virtue, but people get punished for
 temerity; temperance is a virtue, but people get punished for
 over-indulgence; and so on. I take it that the mistakes that we
 think that people are making here, and for which they get
 punished, are mistakes in foresight. We would not say that they
 were punished if they were doing something wrong and then
 subject to an unpredictable natural disaster. So, someone being
 gluttonous or lecherous in a house that falls down is not being
 naturally punished for gluttony or lechery, even though the
 unhappy result is a causal consequence of their engaging in the
 disapproved activity (if they hadn't been eating or whatever,
 they wouldn't have been in the house). What AIDS punishes is
 unsafe sex, not fornication. This, surely, is the only way to
 describe it on the hypothesis of an indifferent and morally
 neutral nature.
 Someone might try to start with the idea of natural
 punishment and find there the core of a complete account which
 extends to the more complicated cases. However, I think that
 these cases are penumbral and that the idea of punishment used
 is metaphorical. We certainly use the language of punishment
 ('one day he'll be punished for his carelessness'), but I think that
 is because we see an analogy between these and central cases
 which permits a metaphorical extension of the language. In any
 case, if the central problem in the justification of punishment is
 to understand how we could be permitted to inflict pain
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 intentionally on other rational human beings against their will,
 then these entirely unintentional operations of nature do not
 help.
 Let us therefore move to cases where the pain follows from
 human rather than natural activity, but where the victim can
 still regard this human activity in a similar spirit to nature. That
 is, instead of supposing that the man is playing a game against
 blind nature, calculating payoffs and risks, we can suppose him
 playing against other human players. Two people, two countries,
 may attempt to influence each other's behaviour by sending
 painful signals. For example, they could be playing tit for tat in
 which one does back to the other what the first one does to him.
 In certain cases this can be mutually beneficial, ensuring that
 they remain on a mutually co-operative course. Again, player
 A, giving a tit for B's tat, could be thought of(or think of himself)
 as punishing B for divergence from the co-operative norm. But,
 again, this seems inappropriate. What has happened here is that
 an artificial unpleasant outcome has been substituted for a
 natural one. However, if the game goes on long enough, this
 becomes as certain and as predictable as a natural outcome.
 Someone to whom the unpleasant thing happens has miscalcu-
 lated; again it would seem that if he is being punished for
 anything, he is being punished for imprudence. He knows the
 rules and his pain is a 'natural' (i.e. predictable) consequence of
 departure from them.
 Here we have intentional activity and so this, it seems, forms a
 more promising model for punishment in the central cases. If tit
 for tat is like punishment, and people arejustified in playing tit
 for tat, then perhaps they are justified in punishment. Yet this
 models the kind of case where Duff would not think the action to
 be justified. Each player is playing in a completely manipulative
 fashion, merely using the other player as a means to satisfying his
 own desires. There is no rational communication; the players,
 for example, do not need a word of language in common. And,
 certainly, if this is thought to be a model of normal punishment,
 there again seems to be the problem that people are punished for
 the wrong things. The only mistake would be imprudence, the
 only commandment 'thou shalt not be found out', and the only
 crime getting caught.
 Suppose therefore we add communication, so that instead of
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 being mere intelligences playing against each other, they agree
 and co-operate, speak the same language, and live in a
 perceived community having shared values. This is the stuff of
 Duffs account, a necessary condition for his ideal treatment. If
 they completely agree with each other, then it might seem at
 first that we would have nothing to punish. However we can
 suppose that there is weakness of will (a lack of fit between belief
 and action) and that people make errors which they can come, on
 reflection, to correct (a lack of fit between initial and final
 belief). So there would be what everyone could recognise to be
 wrong action. Hence there would be something for punishment
 to do, if it could only be justified. But now it seems unimportant
 that there are many people involved. Everything goes through
 just the same if there is only one person talking to himself, giving
 himself reasons, correcting his judgements, berating himself for
 weakness of will, and so on. It is as if the Hegelian geist of the
 community was conversing with itself, developing the idea.
 So when we have the many, we have manipulation; the
 injection of rationality introduces the one. Indeed it might be
 thought to be a theoretical truth that we can only understand
 other people as having beliefs, intentions, and meanings if they
 do, by and large, agree with us; that radical divergence is
 impossible. (Either we are playing games against intelligent
 green insects or else everyone really speaks English.) So suppose
 that there is a community of agreement and that we can model
 this by a single rational individual thinking to himself.
 However, the problem would now seem to be that, although
 there might be space in which punishment could operate, there
 would be no justification for having it. For it means that we
 could only make sense of punishment if we could make sense of
 people punishing themselves; and, it looks at first sight doubtful
 whether they could, or, if they could, why they should. Now,
 accounts like Duffs do in fact incorporate the sense and point of
 self-punishment. This follows for him from the idea of penance.
 The coercive authority, in his ideal account, coerces the
 criminal's attention. It forcibly suggests the appropriate penance
 for what it hopes will be recognised as an evil act. (Even on
 Duff's ideal account, the criminal cannot choose not to undergo
 the action which might form the penance; he can only choose
 whether or not to regard it as a penance.) With the penance we
This content downloaded from 134.84.192.101 on Sun, 14 Apr 2019 07:57:28 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 PUNISHMENT AND CRIME 147
 get self-punishment. So self-punishment is clearly part of Duff's
 account; the difficulty is to make sense of it.
 The problem here is not that of the person doing things to
 himself which are painful. We can have an individual, first-
 person analogue of all the stages travelled so far. Obviously the
 'punishment' for natural improvidence works for the single
 person; Robinson Crusoe also gets his fingers burnt. But a person
 can also play a purely manipulative game against himself
 (against his future self). Assurance in carrying out the threat can
 be secured by external causation. Someone now doesn't want
 that he will be tempted to do something in future. So he now
 secures that this would have a consequence which he hopes will
 be sufficient to deter him when the time comes. So the purely
 manipulative and natural cases have first person analogues and,
 if they count as punishment, then people are punished and (in
 the manipulative case) punish themselves. However, in the kind
 of case that is needed for Duff's account to work, I find this more
 difficult. All we seem to need here is pure judgement. The
 person judges that he has erred. He therefore repents. There
 seems to be no space, though, between judgement and the
 desired result, a space which needs to be filled by pain.
 For Duff the pain seems to be needed to underpin the
 expressive aspect of his theory of punishment. The person
 punished must take his backsliding or initial error seriously. He
 expresses to himself solemnly the idea that he is wrong.
 Nevertheless, I still find it difficult to accept that he needs to
 inflict further pain on himself to show that this is his
 understanding, or to show that he does take it seriously, or to
 express the importance of what he has done. I do not see how the
 extra pain could do any of these things. Of course, if he really has
 judged, and he really is serious, this must influence his future
 belief and action. So he is constrained (he constrains himself) to
 act differently in future. And if, as would normally be the case,
 his wrong has caused harm to others, then he would feel himself
 to be under a duty to give compensation. But this, again, is not
 punishment. We are trying tojustify the painful things extracted
 in criminal law by the state and community such as imprison-
 ment, fines, or capital punishment (all discussed by Duff), not
 the payments of recompense to individuals enforced by the civil
 law. Here I think that the lack of intrinsic connection with the
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 action works against Duff. Recompense to the victim seems
 appropriate, as is repentance and apology. All these are no
 doubt painful, in the sense that people do not like doing them.
 But it is the recompense or apology which is central, the pain
 incidental. I do not see why people, seriously convinced of their
 errors, should inflict pain on themselves for its own sake; or why
 they should undergo a pain wholly separate from recompense or
 apology, such as a fine paid to the state, or imprisonment, or
 corporal or capital punishment. Yet if we cannot make sense of
 this, then the central part of Duffs account (connected as it is
 with penance) falls away.
 It may be that what is lacking here is the public dimension. So
 far I have been supposing a person in a public context (to give
 him more scope for wrong action) but merely inflicting pain on
 himself for his own purposes. But it might be thought that
 although he does not have to inflict pain on himself to show
 himself that he is serious, he does have to, to show others. The
 community, it might be thought, shows that it takes the matter
 seriously by engaging in the expensive business of detection and
 trial. So perhaps in turn a bit of expense on his part is needed to
 show that he also is serious. However, again it is important not
 that the person does something difficult or painful but what it is
 that he does. The best way someone can express his seriousness is
 by acting differently in future or by trying to undo, so far as is
 possible, the effects of his crime. To put the point another way,
 the difference which the social dimension might be thought to
 make is that, while no more than judgement might be needed to
 reconcile someone with himself, more needs to be done to
 reconcile someone with the community. Someone separates
 themselves by sinning, and public penance is needed as a way of
 demonstrating the seriousness of their repentance and so
 regaining their place in the community. Now strength of belief
 can certainly be measured by cost. So, perhaps, in some
 circumstances the willing of something painful on oneself could
 be used as a measure of strength of belief (although, more
 plausibly, it measures the strength of one's desire to be believed).
 However what has to be shown is not just the strength of belief
 but that it has an appropriate content. What the person wants to
 regain is the esteem of his fellows. He has been thought less than
 worthy as a person and now he wants again to be thought
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 worthy. The best way of regaining esteem is to do those things
 which directly, in themselves, gain esteem. That is, if working
 for the poor or powerless, for example, is a way of gaining esteem
 for one's concern for others, then someone who had lost esteem
 because of his cavalier treatment of others might seek to regain it
 in this way. And, of course, he might find this difficult or painful;
 and, of course, it might be something imposed on him or
 suggested to him as a penalty for what he had done. However, it
 wouldn't be because of its painful nature that it gained him
 esteem, but because it was something which would naturally
 gain esteem, whether painful or not. The esteem is independent
 of the pain. Conversely, doing something which was painful,
 such as serving a prison sentence, would not by itself gain
 esteem. So if a person wishes to show his seriousness about being
 restored to the good books of the community, he will not just
 engage in things because they are difficult or painful for him. So
 this cannot be the justification of punishment.
 In fact, once we reach the community, and how someone's
 punishment fits into his own and others' perceptions, then we
 should take seriously that the community is a political
 community. This is the element, I think, normally suppressed or
 treated lightly in accounts of punishment. It is supposed that the
 natural or central locus of punishment is an activity between
 individuals, moralised individuals no doubt and ones sharing
 communal values, but still between individuals. Yet the natural
 context of punishment is where there is already political
 authority. Because there is government, there are laws; and
 because there are laws, there is punishment. The original apple
 is the creation of government and once that has been bitten, all
 else follows. If government or political authority can bejustified,
 then punishment follows naturally and necessarily. It needs no
 further justification. A monopoly of force, designed to coerce
 people against their will, has already been allowed. With the
 granting of the force comes the right to punish; this is the
 instrument to be used. As Bentham says, 'the business of
 government is to promote the happiness of society, by punishing
 and rewarding' (IPML p. 74). The central question here is
 whether government is morally permissible at all; that is the
 question of the moral legitimacy of the state. If the state is
 legitimate, and after all nearly everyone, even if for different
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 reasons, thinks that it is, then it is legitimate to use force to coerce
 the actions of unwilling people. The right to make and to enforce
 law has already been granted. This is a permissive right, and so
 the state is thus allowed to use it as it will, subject to not
 interfering with other rights. That is, we may have a view about
 the right way that this force should be used, including the right
 way in which to punish people. But this is just a view about how
 the state should proceed, a view which we might be able to
 express and have a small influence on its being put into law.
 What the law is, though, is what the state says it is, and this may
 or may not be what we think it ought to be. The state still has a
 right to enforce its law, even if we do not think that it has got the
 law right; this follows from its legitimacy as a state.
 The only way a theory of punishment can be applied,
 therefore, once we allow the entitlement of states to make and
 enforce laws, is by means of individual rights which work as side
 constraints on such enforcement. Obviously, these cannot be too
 extensive, otherwise the state could not be legitimate in the first
 place. It is notorious that philosophers with starting points
 similar to Duffs find it hard to see how any state could be
 legitimate. Conversely, if we have a legitimate state, the right to
 coerce others has already been granted. The most we can have,
 therefore, are moral side constraints on the way such coercion
 operates: principles such that justice demands that only the
 guilty are punished, that people should have fair notice of the
 law, the right to defend themselves and put their point of view,
 and so on. However, subject to these constraints, the state has
 the right to select any of the many permissible answers. It might
 well select a utilitarian approach. That is, subject to these
 constraints, the levels of punishment would be calculated by
 their efficiency as threats and in the interest of maximising
 values such as liberty or security.
 I noted above that Duff resolves his problem of the ideal and
 the actual by adopting a form of constrained utilitarianism.
 Here the same solution emerges, only not now as a reprehensible
 evil. It is just that we have principles of fairness and justice,
 which bound our treatment of individuals. We find that it is not
 inconsistent with these, and it brings great benefits, to have
 states (or other sources of law) which coerce individuals for the
 common interest. So we permit such coercion, and take the
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 benefits, constraining it by these principles ofjustice. We are not
 essentially trying to reform people, although, obviously, we
 would be glad if we could. We are not trying to exact retribution
 for past wrongs, although obviously the idea of retribution
 constrains the field in which we may justly operate. We are not,
 essentially, trying to express things to people, although we
 naturally wish to express things to them if we think they are
 wrong. So in a particular case where we can suppose in advance
 that we are going to have no success with reform or moral
 communication, we may still be entitled to threaten punishment
 in a naked appeal to the self-interest of a prospective offender.
 Of course punishment is nasty. That is its point. But, as Bentham
 said in a manuscript, pain is 'that instrument to which the law
 itself owes all its powers' (UC 69.47). We have taken the good
 things and this is the point at which we pay up. It may still be the
 best of all possible worlds; it is just not ideal in every respect.
 REFERENCES
 Jeremy Bentham IPML An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Athlone
 1970).
 Jeremy Bentham UC 69.47 Bentham MSS at University College London, box 69 sheet
 47.
 R. A. Duff Trials and Punishments (Cambridge 1986).
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 Ross Harrison and R. A. Duff
 II--R. A. Duff
 PUNISHMENT AND PENANCE-A REPLY TO
 HARRISON
 I will focus on two of Ross Harrison's claims: that my account of
 criminal punishment in Trials and Punishments fails ab initio, since
 we cannot make sense of self-punishment; and that criminal
 punishment is better justified as a side-constrained deterrent, by
 showing it to be a necessary implication of the legitimacy of the
 state. Harrison also argues that my response to the gap between
 the ideal and the actual shows me to be, when it comes to the
 crunch, not a strikingly mistaken anti-utilitarian, but a familiar
 kind of side-constrained consequentialist. Though this raises
 important and difficult issues about the impact of theoretical
 ideals on practical actualities, I will not have space to discuss it
 here.
 I
 Punishment and the Legitimacy of the State
 I begin with Harrison's own account of punishment, since my
 concern with self-punishment is partly motivated by a dissatis-
 faction with even a side-constrained account of punishment as a
 deterrent.
 'If government or political authority can be justified', writes
 Harrison, 'then punishment follows naturally and necessarily'
 (p. 149). His argument is, I think, roughly this. Part of what
 distinguishes a state from an anarchistic community in which
 the state either never existed or has withered away, and thus
 part of what we justify if wejustify the state, is the existence of an
 authority with a monopoly of organised force, and with the right
 to decide just how that force is to be used. That right is not the
 unlimited right of a Hobbesian sovereign; individual rights set
 limits on how the state may use its coercive power. But within
 those limits it must be free to use that power 'as it will'. The state
 presumably will (must?) use its coercive power to protect its
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 members against both external and internal attack, and
 punishment is one of the means by which it will do this.' But it is
 for the state to decide just how punishment is to be used, within
 the constraints set by individual rights; and Harrison thinks it
 likely (inevitable?) that it will use punishment as a side-
 constrained deterrent.
 How is the state constrained by individual rights, and free to
 operate 'as it will' within those constraints? A state might not in
 fact respect the rights which we think ought to constrain it. To
 call such rights 'moral side constraints' (p. 150) is perhaps to say
 that we can nonetheless demand that they be respected; and what
 makes this a demand, not just a view 'about how the state should
 proceed' (p. 150), is perhaps that we can properly withhold
 obedience if the state does not respect them. Our views about
 how the state should operate within such constraints, however,
 including our view about the proper uses of punishment, are
 views which we may express, but may not insist upon: we may
 suggest, but not demand, that the state should use its penal
 powers in this way or in that. For in allowing legitimacy to the
 state we allow that such decisions are for the state to make, and
 must accept those decisions unless they infringe individual rights.
 This argument seems intended to silence retributivists and
 other anti-consequentialists. But I do not see why it should.
 First, Harrison allows that we may have views about how the
 state should use its penal powers within the constraints set by
 individual rights. Suppose I agree that a side-constrained system
 of deterrence is consistent with those constraints, and thus that
 the state has the right to use punishment in that way, but believe
 that it should use punishment purely as retribution. My view
 might not prevail; nor can I demand that it prevail, or withhold
 obedience if it does not. But why should this stop me asserting
 and arguing for my view that this is 'the right way in which to
 punish people'?
 Second, we should look more critically at the rights which are
 to constrain the state's freedom, and at the ends which it is to
 pursue. (We can presumably demand that it pursue certain
 general ends as well as that it respect certain rights; its discretion
 1 We need, however, more argument than Harrison provides here to show why the
 state will or should have a system of punishment at all; see Trials and Punishments ch. 6.3.
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 concerns the means to be used, within the limits set by those
 rights, in pursuit of those ends.) For a retributivist might argue,
 not merely that punishment shouldbe retributive, but that it must
 be retributive if it is to respect individual rights; and that even a
 side-constrained system of deterrence infringes rights which
 ought to be respected. Of course if 'the business of government'
 is simply 'to promote the happiness of society' (p. 149), subject
 only to the modest rights-based constraints which Harrison
 mentions (p. 150), we will naturally end up with a side-
 constrained system of deterrence; the end and constraints have
 been so specified that no other account could plausibly emerge.
 But why just that end; why just those constraints?
 Suppose we take seriously the Kantian demand that we
 should treat each other as ends, not as means; that, we may say,
 individuals have a right to be respected as rational and
 autonomous beings. This will make a difference both to the ends
 which the state should pursue and to the means by which it may
 pursue them. We might still say that the business of government
 is to promote 'the happiness of society', but that 'happiness'
 must now involve the flourishing of rational and autonomous
 lives; and the means to be used must be appropriate to the end as
 thus conceived, and consistent with the respect which is owed to
 each citizen. We can flesh this slogan out by indicating its
 implications for the criminal law.
 This Kantian requirement explains the importance of the
 rule of law-it shows why a state should govern its citizens'
 conduct by a system of law rather than by other, possibly more
 effective, methods of social control. For the law addresses the
 citizen as a rational agent: it seeks not merely her obedience to
 demands which it imposes on her (I am talking here of ideals
 rather than actualities), but her assent to obligations which are
 justified to her in terms of the good of the community; it aims to
 guide her conduct not by any means which may be economically
 effective, but by offering her good and relevant reasons for
 accepting its requirements. We can similarly explain the
 significance of a system of criminal trials as the appropriate
 method for dealing with alleged breaches of the law. A trial does
 not aim merely to reach a decision on a defendant's past conduct
 and future disposal; it calls him to answer a charge of wrong-
 doing. It aims to engage him in a rational process of critical
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 argument, and to justify to him, if he is convicted, the
 condemnation which his conviction expresses. The proper aim
 of the criminal law and the criminal trial is rational communi-
 cation and persuasion; they are appropriate ways of trying to
 guide the conduct, and of responding to the alleged misconduct,
 of rational agents.2
 What of punishment? A side-constrained system of deterrence,
 such as Harrison favours, does to an extent treat its citizens as
 rational agents. It reserves punishment for the guilty, and thus
 respects the requirement that we should be free from the law's
 coercive attentions until we wilfully breach its justified demands.
 It gives defendants a fair trial; it can justify their punishment to
 those who are punished, by reference to their guilt and to the
 common good. It thus respects the requirement that the law
 should both hear the citizen and justify its demands and
 impositions to her. It seeks to guide the citizens' conduct by
 reasons, giving those who are not sufficiently impressed by the
 moral considerations which underpin the law prudential reason
 to obey the law. It thus respects the requirement that we should
 try to modify the conduct of others only by giving them reason to
 modify their own conduct. These requirements are aspects of the
 demand that the state should treat its citizens as rational agents;
 and a side-constrained system of deterrent punishments can,
 unlike a system which simply seeks the most economically
 effective means of preventing crime, claim to respect them.3
 But it does not fully respect that Kantian demand. Harrison
 notes the objection to utilitarianism that it sanctions using the
 criminal as a means to the good of others.4 Now a system of side-
 constrained deterrence does not treat the criminal merely as a
 means: he is given fair warning that he will be punished if he
 breaks the law, and he is punished only if he breaks it.5 The
 deeper objection to such a system is, however, that it seeks to
 manipulate, and thus fails to respect, not only those who are
 2See Trials and Punishments chs. 3-4.
 3See, for instance, J. R. Lucas, 'Or Else', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
 Supplementary Volume, 1969, p. 207.
 4Harrison p. 141; see J. G. Murphy, 'Marxism and Retribution', Philosophy and
 Public Affairs, 1973, p. 217.
 5 See S. I. Benn, 'An Approach to the Problems of Punishment' Philosophy 1958, p. 325;
 N. Walker, Punishment, Danger and Stigma (Blackwell 1980) pp. 80-85.
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 punished, but all those whose obedience is sought or secured by
 the threat of punishment.
 To be autonomous is to be self-determining, in the sense that
 my actions and beliefs must be mine, reflecting my own
 understanding of what I see to be good reasons for action or
 belief. Now a respect for another person as an autonomous agent
 does not preclude an attempt to persuade her to think or act
 differently; but it constrains both the end I may seek and the
 means I may use to achieve it. My aim must not bejust to change
 her actions or beliefs, but to persuade her to see for herself that
 she should think or act differently; and I must try to do this only
 by giving her reasons to think or act differently. I must also give
 her what I regard as good and relevant reasons. If I try to persuade
 her by what I regard as bad or irrelevant reasons, I cease to treat
 her with the honesty and respect which are due to her as
 someone who should determine her own actions and beliefs in
 the light of her own best understanding; I treat her instead as
 someone whom I may try to control or manipulate as a means to
 my own ends.
 To illustrate. In a philosophical dispute you remain unper-
 suaded by the arguments which, I think, justify my view. If my
 aim is simply to get you to accept my view, I might (if I think I
 can get away with it) resort to bullying, and try to force you into
 accepting my view; or I offer you what I take to be bad or
 fallacious arguments, which I think may in fact persuade you.
 Such tactics are not unknown in philosophical discussion, and
 they might bring you to accept my view. But they are
 objectionable for two reasons. First, they abandon the proper
 aim of philosophical discussion. For such discussion must, if it is
 to remain true to the discipline's own values, aim not at securing
 agreement by whatever means may be effective, but at truth or
 rational agreement; and that aim cannot be achieved by
 bullying or by fraudulent argument. Second, in using such
 tactics I manipulate you. Instead of appealing to you as a
 rational agent whom I should try to persuade only by good and
 relevant arguments (and by whom I should be ready to be
 persuaded myself), I treat you as someone whose beliefs I will try
 to change by whatever means I can.6
 6 Compare Plato, Gorgias 457-8, 472.
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 As with philosophy, so with morality. If I believe that you
 ought to change your ways, I may try to persuade you to do so.
 But if I am to respect you as I should, my aim must not just be so
 to modify your beliefs or attitudes that you come to behave,
 externally, as I think you should-an aim which might be
 achieved by bullying, threatening or deceiving you. It must be
 to persuade you to see for yourself that you should change your
 ways, in the light of the values which I think should guide you;
 and the only way to do this is to give you reasons for changing
 your ways which embody those values. That is why it is an
 objection to utilitarianism that it sanctions moral deceit-that a
 utilitarian who gives me moral advice may urge on me, not what
 she takes to be the truth that I should act so as to maximise
 happiness, but whatever considerations she thinks will in fact get
 me to behave in the most useful way.7 For she then treats me, not
 as a rational moral agent, but simply as a mechanism for
 maximising happiness.
 As with morality, so with law. The proper aim of a system of
 law is to secure not merely obedience, but the citizen's
 acceptance of obligations which are justified to him by relevant
 reasons which show the law to serve the common good. This is
 part of the idea of law, as a system which claims not just power
 but authority, and a condition which must be met if the law is to
 treat the citizen as an autonomous agent. Now a system of
 deterrent punishment abandons that ideal aim. It seeks
 prudential obedience to the law, rather than obedience which
 reflects an acceptance of the law's demands as being appropriately
 justified. It thus manipulates all those whose obedience it tries to
 secure by the threat of punishment. Instead of appealing to the
 relevant reasons which justify the law's demands, it offers new
 and irrelevant (because unrelated to the reasons which supposedly
 justify the law's demands) prudential reasons for obedience. It
 thus uses those whom it threatens as means to the 'happiness of
 society'.
 One who believes that citizens have the right to be respected
 as autonomous agents could thus argue that this moral side-
 constraint on the state's use of its coercive power forbids even a
 ' See, for example, J. J. C. Smart, 'An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics' inJ.J.
 C. Smart & B. Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (CUP 1973) pp. 49-52.
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 side-constrained system of deterrent punishment. In using
 punishment thus, the state does not merely use its legitimate
 discretion in a way which we might think misguided; it infringes
 the rights which limit that discretion. Harrison might argue that
 such a constraint would be so restrictive that 'the state could not
 be legitimate in the first place' (p. 150). Whether this is so
 depends on whether coercion can ever be compatible with a due
 respect for autonomy. Such a respect does, I think, permit the
 state to use force in defence against both external and internal
 attack. But can we provide a rationale for punishment which
 shows the imposition of punishment to be consistent with a
 proper respect for the citizen? Part of my aim in Trials and
 Punishments was to show that such a rationale can be provided, at
 least at the level of ideal theory. But Harrison finds that
 rationale unpersuasive, insofar as it depends on what he sees as
 the nonsensical idea of self-punishment.
 II
 Penance and Self-Punishment
 Criminal punishment, I argued, should ideally aim to become
 self-punishment; the proper aim of inflicting punishment on a
 criminal is to persuade her to accept her punishment, to will it
 for herself, as a penance for her crime. The idea of penance, as
 punishment which is voluntarily undertaken, is crucial to this
 account. But why should I found an account of criminal
 punishment, which is typically imposed by others, on the idea of
 self-punishment, which precisely lacks the coercive character
 that makes imposed punishment morally problematic? One
 who thinks that criminal punishment requires a consequentialist
 justification, or doubts that it can respect the criminal's
 autonomy, might allow that those who wish to 'punish'
 themselves should be able to do so, but deny that this can help to
 justify the infliction by others of punishment on those who do not
 wish to be punished.
 Making sense of self-punishment does not yet, admittedly,
 justify imposed punishments; and the justificatory story which
 connects them is not a simple one. But, for several reasons, it is
 worth beginning with self-punishment nonetheless.
 First, I think that self-punishment reveals an essential part of
 the meaning of punishment, and thus shows what must be
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 justified if we are to justify imposed punishments. For a
 utilitarian, punishment consists essentially in the infliction of
 pain on alleged offenders. It is this intrinsic evil which must be
 justified, by its beneficial effects. For some retributivists,
 punishment consists in imposing on a criminal a burden to
 match the fair burden of self-restraint which he refused to
 accept.8 To justify criminal punishment we would then need to
 show how the state has the right or duty thus to deprive the
 criminal of his unfair advantage. I argued that what is essential
 to punishment is an outward or manifest suffering which gives
 symbolic expression to the pain of remorse. This meaning is most
 easily seen in the case of self-punishment; and to justify
 criminal punishment we must then show how imposed punish-
 ments can come to have this meaning, and how a state or
 community can properly take this kind of interest in the moral
 well-being of its members.
 Second, I have argued that if the law's demands and the
 criminal trial are to show a due respect for the citizen's
 autonomy, they must be understood not merely in terms of what
 is done to, or imposed on, the citizen, but in terms of a dialogue
 between state and citizen. I believe that self-punishment
 provides a model of punishment which, if we can translate it to
 the context of criminal punishment, will help us to find there too
 the communicative purposes which are crucial to the law and
 the criminal trial; and this will help us to show that imposed
 punishments can also respect the criminal's autonomy.
 Third, the claim that criminal punishment ideally aims to
 become self-punishment captures, I believe, the truth which is
 distorted by those who try to show that the criminal does
 rationally will her own punishment.' Such attempts must fail.
 But they are also unnecessary, since they mistakenly suppose
 that coercion infringes autonomy unless it accords with the
 rational will of the person coerced. Certainly we must be able to
 justify coercion to the person whom we coerce, as an appropriate
 response to her own voluntary conduct; and, if our aim is to
 modify her conduct, we must do this only by offering her
 relevant reasons to modify her own conduct. But this does not
 8See, for instance, J. G. Murphy, op. cit. (n. 4 above).
 9 See Murphy, op. cit.; Trials and Punishments ch. 8.
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 rule out every kind of coercion to which the person coerced does
 not consent.
 One paradigm ofjustified coercion is the use of force to defeat
 an unjustified attack. Another, perhaps, is the forcible exaction
 of a debt which the debtor refuses to pay. Such force is justified
 only if rational persuasion has failed, and must if possible be
 justified to the person who is coerced; but it neither requires nor
 presupposes their consent. What makes it consistent with a due
 respect for their autonomy is that it is a defensive response to
 their wilful conduct. It does not aim to make them do anything,
 but rather to prevent them carrying through a wrong on which
 they have embarked. This is obvious in the case of defence
 against an attack, but it also applies to the exaction of a debt, if
 we can say that refusing to pay a debt amounts to trying to keep
 what belongs to another. For we can then say that in exacting
 the debt we are simply preventing the recalcitrant debtor from
 carrying through his wrongful detention of another's property.'0
 If we could portray punishment as something other than an
 attempt to modify the criminal's future behaviour-as, perhaps,
 a matter of defence against attack or of exacting a debt-self-
 punishment would not be crucial. Although we would need to
 justify her punishment to the criminal as an appropriate
 response to her crime, and hope that she would accept that
 justification, neither that justification nor its acceptance would
 be internal to the punishment. But we cannot portray punishment
 in either of these ways.
 As to defence, we cannot just say that punishment prevents
 the criminal from committing future crimes; for if defensive
 coercion is to be consistent with a due respect for the person
 coerced, it must be a response to an attack in which he is now
 engaged. A pre-emptive strike to prevent an attack on which he
 might embark infringes his autonomy, by pre-empting his
 choices. Preventive punishments likewise infringe the autonomy
 of those who are punished.
 As to exacting a debt, a monetary debt can be paid without
 the debtor's consent-her creditor simply takes what is his. So
 0o Compare Devlin's suggestion that returning his property to another person does not
 in law amount to a 'positive' act, but only to a 'negative' act of'refraining from detinue';
 NCB v Gamble (1958) 3 All ER 203, at 207.
This content downloaded from 134.84.192.101 on Sun, 14 Apr 2019 07:57:28 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 162 II-R. A. DUFF
 too, were punishment a burden of restraint which a criminal
 owed to those over whom he had taken an unfair advantage,
 that debt would be paid if he suffered the burden, with or
 without his consent. But this is not, I think, what punishment
 means.1" The criminal does, in a sense, owe a debt to his fellow
 citizens, of repentance, apology and self-reform. But this debt
 cannot simply be exacted from him; for it is paid only if he
 repents, apologises, and reforms himself.
 How then can the imposition of punishment respect the
 criminal's autonomy? We must show it to be an appropriate
 response to her past crime which aims to modify her future
 conduct only by giving her good and relevant reasons to modify
 her own conduct; and we can do this by emphasising its
 communicative purpose. Punishment aims to persuade the
 criminal to accept the justified condemnation of her past crime,
 and the understanding of the nature and implications of that
 crime, which it expresses. It also aims to affect her future
 conduct: by persuading her of the wrongness of her past crime
 we persuade her that she ought not to behave thus in future. But
 its aim is not to coerce or manipulate her into obeying the law,
 since it seeks to persuade her of the good and relevant reasons
 which justify the claim that she ought to obey the law. It seeks,
 but does not coerce, her understanding and her assent.
 But we could pursue this communicative aim by a system of
 purely symbolic punishments. Why should we add 'hard
 treatment' punishments (imprisonment, fines etc.), which are
 painful independently of their punitive meaning, if not to add a
 prudential (and thus manipulative) deterrent to the law's moral
 appeal? Because, first, hard treatment aims to make the
 inattentive criminal hear the message it expresses-to force his
 attention onto his crime; and, second, it is a penance through
 which he can, if he comes to accept his punishment, express and
 reinforce his repentant understanding of his crime. Such
 punishment can be justified even if the criminal will not accept
 it, as an attempt to persuade him to accept it. But it must, in two
 ways, seek his assent. It aims to persuade him to accept it
 retroactively, as a proper way of expressing to him what he now
 sees to be a proper condemnation of his past crime, and of
 " See Trials and Punishments ch. 8.2.
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 persuading him to accept that condemnation; and to accept it
 concurrently, as a penance which he should now undergo for his
 crime. In accepting it as a penance, he accepts it as a
 punishment which he should impose on himself. But it is this
 idea of self-punishment that Harrison finds senseless, when it
 involves inflicting on oneself something which is essentially,
 rather than merely incidentally, painful.
 Harrison discusses various implications of a recognition that I
 have done wrong. None, he thinks, allows room for the kind of
 punitive pain of which I need to make sense if I am to ascribe a
 penitential meaning to hard-treatment criminal punishments.
 My judgment that I have done wrong leads to repentance and
 self-reform; but there is 'no space' between judgment and
 repentance 'which needs to be filled by pain'. 'Extra pain' is not
 needed to express to myself the sincerity of my repentance; nor is
 it the appropriate way to express this to others. I can do that best
 by apology and compensation; and while these 'are no doubt
 painful, in the sense that people do not like doing them', that
 pain is 'incidental'. So too, if I want to 'regain the esteem' of my
 fellows, I can best do this by doing 'things which directly, in
 themselves, gain esteem', and which are painful, if at all, only
 incidentally. There is no reason to inflict on myself some 'wholly
 separate' pain of punishment 'for its own sake' (pp. 147-149).
 Penance, like hard-treatment punishment, involves 'separate'
 or 'extra' pain in that it involves some imposition, or deprivation,
 or burden, which is painful quite apart from its penitential
 meaning. To make sense of penance as self-punishment, we need
 to see how the pain it involves is expressively related to the pain
 which is essential to repentance: This will involve showing that
 Harrison is wrong to take pain to be only 'incidental' to apology
 and compensation; and that he is also wrong to see the pain
 involved in self-punishment as being inflicted merely 'for its own
 sake', or as being 'wholly separate' from repentance, apology,
 and reconciliation.
 A certain kind of pain is essential, not merely incidental, to a
 repentant recognition of wrong-doing, and to expressing my
 repentance to others-not just because this is something that
 people do not like doing, but because what is done must, if it is
 sincere, be painful. If I recognise and repent the wrong I have
 done you, I am necessarily pained by it-by my own guilt and
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 wickedness, by the harm I have done to you and to my
 relationship to you. Such pain is essential in that if I did not
 suffer it, I would not have sincerely repented my wrong-doing,
 or fully understood its nature and implications. If I repent my
 offence, I will also want to try to remedy the harm I have done,
 and to repair the relationships I have damaged. This will
 involve apology and compensation, which are essentially
 painful in that they aim to express to others my pained
 recognition of what I have done. What could an apology for a
 serious wrong be, other than empty words, if it did not express
 my painful remorse? What could compensation (as distinct from
 help to someone who has suffered a natural misfortune) amount
 to if it did not express my sorrowful repentance?
 To repent and apologise is to make myself suffer, or find that I
 cannot help but suffer, for the wrong I have done. This pain
 might be called a kind of punishment, but it is neither imposed
 'for its own sake', nor separate from repentance. What,
 however, of the 'extra' pain which I might impose on myself as a
 penance? I have seriously wronged a friend. For the sake of
 material gain I betrayed her trust, and thus caused her serious
 financial and emotional harm. Why should my repentant
 recognition of my wrong-doing involve any more pain than that
 which is intrinsic to it?
 First, it will prevent me from enjoying what I would otherwise
 enjoy. If I truly recognise and repent what I have done, I will not
 be able to enjoy, for instance, my usual social pleasures. I do not
 decide to deprive myself of them as a punishment; but I cannot
 enjoy them, any more than I could enjoy them whilst mourning
 the death of a friend. I cannot enjoy them because my attention
 and my concern are dominated by the wrong I have done. Why
 did I do it? How could I have betrayed her like that? What is she
 suffering? How can I show my remorse, or make restitution to
 her? What does my behaviour show about my moral character,
 and about the extent of my concern for others? How can I begin
 to reform myself? Such concerns, which are an essential part of
 my repentant recognition of what I have done, are not
 compatible with continuing to enjoy my life as if nothing had
 happened.
 Second, I may see the need to impose some 'extra' pain on
 myself. We can imagine beings, as Harrison seems to (p. 146),
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 who might have no need for this-who might do wrong, but
 whose concern for the good is such that they recognise and fully
 repent such wrongs as soon as they are done. Such beings would
 indeed find no space between judgment and repentance-and
 thus no need for deliberately imposed penances or punishments,
 as distinct from the pain which belongs with repentance. They
 would suffer when they do do wrong, but would not need to
 impose 'extra' pain on themselves. We, however, are not such
 beings. We are depressingly and familiarly unwilling to face up
 to our wrong-doings. My initial judgment that I have done
 wrong might well not be fully authentic. At worst it may pay
 mere lip service to the values I have flouted; or it may mark an as
 yet incomplete and shallow recognition of the nature of what I
 have done. There is often a gap between such judgment and
 repentance, created by the common possibility of self-deceptive
 attempts at self-justification or excuse, or of turning my
 attention away from my offence to pleasanter topics. Repentance
 is anyway not something which is done in a moment. It requires
 a proper understanding of what I have done, which both owns
 the wrong as mine and disowns it as something I condemn-a
 determination to improve myself, and to make such apology and
 restitution as I can. Repentance is achieved through time and
 only with difficulty; and the difficulty flows from our unwilling-
 ness to confront our wrong-doings.
 These familiar facts create space for penance or self-
 punishment. I realise that I need something which will focus my
 attention where it should be focused-something to remind me
 of what I have done, and of the need to respond appropriately to
 it; and this need can be met by a penance which I impose on
 myself. Penances are various kinds of hair shirt which, being
 essentially uncomfortable, provide an ever-present reminder of
 my wrong-doing. A penance must be painful, since what is
 pleasant cannot serve to focus my attention on my guilt; and I
 may choose a penance which has a particular symbolic relation
 to my wrong-doing. If I did wrong for the sake of material gain,
 my penance might take the form of a material deprivation. This
 would express and reinforce my condemnation of the excessive
 concern for material goods which my action manifested. If I
 betrayed a friendship, my penance might involve depriving
 myself of social intercourse. I have broken the bonds of
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 friendship, and rendered myself unfit for it. If my wrong-doing
 involved arrogant self-assertion, my penance might take the
 form of humbling myself; and so on.
 Thus far penance is a private matter between me and my
 conscience (or between me and God). It serves not so much to
 express an already complete repentance as to help me repent, or
 reinforce an otherwise uncertain repentance. But we can also see
 how penance can help me to express my repentance to others.
 Beings less imperfect than us might not need this-they would
 know of each other that their repentance was genuine and their
 apologies fully sincere; but if I am to assure others like myself of
 the sincerity of my repentance, I may do this by undertaking a
 penance. This might take the form of repairing the material
 harm I have done, or of 'working for the poor and powerless' (p.
 149). But as penances these serve to express my penitence; and as
 such they have the essential character of something painful
 which I impose on myself, as an outward and public expression
 of my painful remorse. The pain which they involve is 'extra', in
 that they are painful or burdensome quite apart from their
 penitential meaning. But it is not imposed 'for its own sake', as
 something 'wholly separate' from repentance; for it is through
 such pain that I both express and reinforce my repentance.
 This, I hope, answers Harrison's objection, by showing the
 sense that penance or self-punishment can make as both a
 vehicle for and an expression of a repentant understanding of
 one's wrong-doing. It does not yet, of course, justify the
 imposition of criminal punishments as penances, even at the
 level of ideal theory. To do that we would need to show how, just
 as a self-imposed penance can assist repentance, so punishment
 which is imposed by others can help to bring a wrong-doer to
 repentance (and can thus become a penance); and how a state or
 a community can claim the right to try in this way to bring
 wrong-doers to repentance. I believe that this can be done,
 though I cannot do it here;'2 but doing it will show us just how
 distant the ideal is from the actual. That gap between the ideal
 and the actual creates a serious moral problem, notjust because
 it is wide-were that all, we should simply do all we can to
 bridge it-but because, on the one hand, I believe that a direct
 "2 See Trials and Punishments chs. 9-10.
This content downloaded from 134.84.192.101 on Sun, 14 Apr 2019 07:57:28 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 PUNISHMENT AND CRIME 167
 attempt to make our penal practices approach the ideal would
 actually be destructive of the ideal itself; whilst, on the other
 hand, simply to say that we must not punish unless and until
 punishment can be what it ideally ought to be, seems to me to be a
 recipe for letting the heavens fall. We face a conflict between
 moral demands which are, I think, neither commensurable nor
 reconcilable-between the categorical demand that we refrain
 from injustice, and the consequential demand that we prevent
 the heavens falling. And while we must respond to this conflict, I
 do not think we can talk of a 'solution' to it.
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